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Defending the Golden Door:
The Persistence of Ad Hoc and Ideological
Decision Making in U.S. Refugee Law
J. MICAEL CAVOSIE*
INTRODUCTION
The United States is a nation of immigrants and refugees,' yet it has
historically and paradoxically viewed newcomers distrustfully and sought to
limit their numbers.2 This bipolarity3 has become more distinct as immigration
and refugee levels have risen4 and is perhaps most acute in the area of
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1981,
Butler University.
1. In fact, "[o]ur history is largely the story of immigration." Cow&nTrms ON THE
JUDIcIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPREsENTATIVES AND UNITED STATES SENATE, 97TH CONG., lsr
S ss., U.S. ImaioaRTON PoLicY AND T NATIONAL INTEREsT I (Joint Comm. Print 1981).
Welcoming homeless refugees is "one of the oldest themes in America's history." S. RaP. No.
256, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD~iN. NEWS 141,
141. Approximately seven percent of the current United States population was born in another
country. Biskupic, Sweeping Changes Abroad Confound U.S. Policy, 1990 CONG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 592.
2. Congress first began regulating the influx of immigrants over a century ago. See, e.g.,
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 3, 18 Stat. 477, 477 (proscribing, among other things, "the
importation into the United States of women for the purposes of prostitution"); Act of May
6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58 (the first of the so-called Chinese Exclusion Laws,
suspending for ten years the "coming of Chinese laborers to the United States"); Act of Aug.
3, 1882, ch. 376, §§ 1-2, 22 Stat. 214, 214 (imposing a 50r duty on every immigrant and
prohibiting the entry of "any convict, lunatic, idiot, or any person unable to take care of
himself or herself without becoming a public charge").
3. One commentator has observed that "[h]istorically, the United States has led the world
in willingness to admit immigrants. Yet for at least one hundred years that willingness has
competed with widespread public sentiment in favor of limiting immigration flow." Scanlan,
Regulating Refugee Flow: Legal Alternatives and Obligations under the Refugee Act of 1980,
56 NOTE Dxma LAw. 618, 619 (1981) (footnotes omitted). This contrast was vividly illustrated
during the debates culminating in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat.
4978 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). For example, Senator Simpson stated that the
United States should accept "the hideous reality that there are many more people who want to
come here than there is room or intent to accommodate them." Biskupic, Senate Votes 81-17
to Revamp U.S. Visa-Allocation System, 1989 CONG. Q. WEEKLY RaP. 1785, 1786. Conversely,
Senator Kennedy argued that "[w]e can't afford to put a sign on the Statue of Liberty that
says, 'No Vacancy."' Id. at 1785.
4. Asylum Adjudications Procedures, I C.F.R. § 305.89-4 (1990). The waiting list for
United States immigrant visas comprises nearly 2.5 million people. See Biskupic, supra note 1,
at 592. Asylum applications rose from roughly 2000 in 1970 to nearly 60,000 in 1988. Asylum
Adjudication Procedures, supra. Globally, the number of refugees exceeds 15 million. Procla-
mation No. 6219, 3 C.F.R. 239-40 (1990) (President Bush proclaiming Refugee Day, 1990).
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United States refugee and asylum policy.5 Indeed, this policy may be perceived
as mirroring the dichotomy. On one hand, since World War II the United
States has admitted hundreds of thousands of refugees; 6 the existence-if
not the depth-of humanitarian motivation is beyond dispute.7 But just as
certainly there have been less praiseworthy practices. These refugee admis-
sions generally were not pursuant to consistent and structured programs but
rather were sporadic and ad hoc, the result of domestic and geopolitical
exigencies.' Even more damning is the strong undercurrent of ideology
characterizing these decisions. Bluntly put, refugees from countries hostile
to the United States have invariably been accorded United States protection
while equally worthy refugees from friendly countries have met with far less
success.
9
The Refugee Act of 198010 purported to end this disparity by establishing
a prospective, nonideological framework for refugee admissions.1 However,
two recent developments in United States refugee law suggest a resurgence
of the old practices. One is the ad hoc revision of the definition of a refugee
5. See T. A NaUOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMoRATION: PROCESS AND PoLcY 616 (1985). The
authors contend that
there is an inherent tension that runs through all political and legal decisionnaking
on refugee and asylum questions in the United States. The notion of refugee
evokes sympathy. The possibility of resulting privileges, especially a potential right
to resettle indefinitely, evokes suspicion that the unworthy are trying to claim that
status.
Id.; see also G. FouaJ.ANos, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INGRESS OF ALIENS 120 (1986) (characterizing
such tension as a "competition of principles: on the one hand sovereignty and its related
concepts (territorial supremacy, self-defence, self-preservation), and, on the other hand, human-
itarian principles deriving from both general international law and from treaties" (footnote
omitted)). But cf. Lopez, The Moral Basis of Immigration Policy, in THE REPORT OF THE U.S.
SEVECT COMMIssION ON IMMGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 29-31 (1980)
(arguing on moral grounds against the sovereign right to exclude).
This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. In fact, "[s]tates the world over
consistently have exhibited great reluctance to give up their sovereign right to decide which
persons will, and which will not, be admitted to their territory, and given a right to settle
there." Hyndman, Refugees Under International Law with a Reference to the Concept of
Asylum, 60 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 148, 153 (1986).
6. D. CARLINER, L. GutrENTAG, A. HELTON & W. HENDERSON, THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS
AND REI uGEs 46 (1990).
7. See Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17
J.L. RmORm 243, 243 (1989) ("The United States has traditionally had one of the most generous
and compassionate refugee programs."); Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Nu-
merical Control, 36 U. Muan L. R-v. 819, 847 (1982) ("The basic foreign policy considerations
in refugee admission have always been leavened with genuine humanity.").
8. Scanlan, supra note 7, at 847.
9. That political ideology permeated United States refugee law, at least until 1980, is a
well-established theme. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmN. NEws at 144. See generally Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U.
Mum L. RE,. 865 (1982) (article devoted to the role of ideology in United States refugee law).
10. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
11. Helton, supra note 7, at 250.
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to grant special status to certain ideologically favored groups.'2 Another is
a provision in the Immigration Act of 1990 which addresses the adjustment
to permanent resident alien status of a select few aliens. 3
Part I of this Note will discuss the concept of the refugee under interna-
tional law for, insofar as the United States has bound itself by international
treaties, 14 any discussion of United States law must be informed by principles
of international law. Part II will relate the history of United States refugee
and asylum law and the patchwork attempts to fulfill international obliga-
tions. It is in this section that the ascendancy of ideology becomes apparent.
Part III will consider the new developments and explain how they continue,
rather than ameliorate, those propensities. Finally, Part IV will propose
measures more consistent with a nondiscriminatory, forward-looking policy.
I. THE REFUGEE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
The international community has developed a significant body of refugee
law during the twentieth century.'. Initially these agreements, usually in the
form of conventions, were in response to specific international crises;' 6
refugees thus were defined situationally rather than generally.' 7 Over time a
more general definition emerged."8 Currently the definition, as well as an
enumeration of refugee rights, 9 is contained in the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees (Convention) ° and its supplementary Protocol.2'
12. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-167, § 599(D), 103 Stat. 1195, 1261-62 (1989).
13. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 104, 104 Stat. at 4985 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1255).
14. Treaties entered into by the United States become part of "the supreme Law of the
Land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2; see also L. HENIN, FoRmN AnF'ms AND THE CoNsTirmoN
156-67 (1972) (section entitled "Treaties as Law of the Land").
15. A discussion beyond these relatively recent developments is outside of the scope of this
Note. For a more lengthy treatment of the history of international refugee law, see A. GRAHL-
MADSEN, Tan STATUS OF REFGEES iN INTERNATIoNAL LAw §§ 9-20 (1966).
16. Hyndman, supra note 5, at 148.
17. Id. Examples include the Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to
Russian and Armenian Refugees, May 12, 1926, 89 L.N.T.S. 2004 (defining as a refugee. "any
person of Russian origin who does not enjoy ... the protection of the Government of the
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and who has not acquired another nationality"), and the
Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures
Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 2006 (extending
refugee status to Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, and persons of Syrian, Kurdish, or Turkish
origin).
18. Cf. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, 159
L.N.T.S. 3663.
19. Refugees' rights under international law are discussed in Part I.B. of this Note.
20. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, T.I.A.S.
No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 [hereinafter Convention].
21. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 8791 [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol incorporates by
19921
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A. The Convention/Protocol Definition of a Refugee
As modified by the Protocol, 22 the Convention defines as a refugee any
person who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country."2 3
As the definition indicates, four elements are required for a person to be
declared a refugee: (1) the person must be outside the country of his
nationality; (2) the person must be unable or unwilling to seek the protection
of that country; (3) this inability or unwillingness must stem from a well-
founded fear of persecution; and (4) the feared persecution must derive from
reference the substantive terms of the Convention. Id. art. I, para. 1. Thus, .a State may bind
itself to the terms of the Convention by signing either the Convention or the Protocol. This
Note will frequently refer to the two treaties jointly as the Convention/Protocol since the two
effectively are one.
22. The Protocol deleted phrases in the Convention's refugee definition limiting the deter-
mination of refugee status to events occurring before January 1, 1951. Id. art. 1(2). This
modification explicitly acknowledged the continuing creation of new refugee groups. Sexton,
Political Refugees, Nonrefoulement and State Practice: A Comparative Study, 18 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 731, 736 (1985).
23. Convention, supra note 20, art. 1(A)(2). Additionally, article l(A)(1) expressly incor-
porates within the Convention persons declared refugees under certain previous international
arrangements ("statutory refugees"), namely "the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June
1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14
September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization." Id. art. I(A)(1)
(footnotes omitted). Since the most recent of these would have pertained to situations occurring
over sixty years ago, it seems doubtful that many statutory refugees remain.
The Convention definition is certainly no panacea and fails to address persons many people
would probably consider "refugees." Most notably, persons fleeing natural disasters, war, and
starvation are not encompassed within the definition. T. ALEnq-nos & D. MATIN, supra note
5, at 615. Another writer, although generally praising the definition, comments that it nevertheless
"is inadequate to cover various categories of refugees that have come under attention since...
1967." Stirke, Refugee Status Under International Law, 64 AusTRAI.L L.J. 88, 88 (1990).
Although the Convention/Protocol definition of a refugee may predominate in international
law, see infra notes 78-79 and accompanying text, alternative definitions have been advocated.
For example, the Organization of African Unity definition reflects the United Nations persecution
approach, but adds that
the term "Refugee" shall also apply to every person who, owing to external
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part of [sic] the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is
compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in
another place outside his country of origin or nationality.
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10,
1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. No. 14691; see also Shacknove, Who is a Refugee?, 95 ETIcs 274, 284
(1985) (defining as refugees those "persons whose government fails to protect their basic needs,
who have no remaining recourse other than to seek international restitution of these needs, and
who are so situated that international assistance is possible").
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being a member of a certain race, religion, nationality, or particular social
group or from holding a particular political opinion.24
"Nationality" is synonymous with "citizenship. "21 Thus, to seek refugee
status one cannot be within his or her country of citizenship: "International
protection cannot come into play as long as a person is within the territorial
jurisdiction of his home country."' 26
"Unable" and "unwilling" denote different scenarios. A person is unable
to seek his country's protection if that country cannot extend it-as in a
country torn by civil war-or refuses to extend it-as in a classic case of
persecution. 27 To be unwilling to seek national protection, on the other hand,
one must be motivated by a "well-founded fear of persecution"; 28 an
irrational or unfounded fear of seeking help would be insufficient to warrant
international concern. 29
The phrase "well-founded fear of being persecuted" is the cornerstone of
the definition and embodies the distinguishing characteristic of a refugee.30
"Fear" is a state of mind and, therefore, subjective.3 It is qualified, however,
by "well-founded," apparently dictating an objective determination. 32 Ac-
cordingly, "[tihe term 'well-founded fear' ... contains a subjective and an
objective element, and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both
elements must be taken into consideration. ' 33 A determination of the appli-
cant's subjective state of mind necessarily hinges upon his or her personality
and credibility.34 In discerning the objective element, the conditions prevalent
in the applicant's home country must be considered. 35 Grahl-Madsen advo-
cates finding a well-founded fear whenever "a reasonable person would draw
the conclusion from external facts that he would be subject to persecution
in his home country."36 "Persecution," although seemingly incapable of a
precise and universal definition, 37 certainly exists whenever there is a threat
24. Convention, supra note 20, art. I(A)(2); G. GooDwiN-Gn.L, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNA-
TIoNAL LAw 13 (1983).
25. OFFICE OF UNrD NATIONS HIGH CoMMISsioNER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCE-
DUM AND CRIEA FOR Dmm Nq-G REFUGEE STATUS para. 87 (1979) [hereinafter U.N.
REFUGEE HANDBooK].
26. Id. para. 88.
27. Id. para. 98.
28. Id. para. 100.
29. Id.
30. Id. para. 37. Grahl-Madsen uses the descriptive phrase "essence of refugeehood." A.
Gi uu-MADsE,, supra note 15, § 35, at 74.
31. U.N. REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 37; A. GRAH-MADSEN, supra note 15,
§ 76, at 173.
32. U.N. REFUG-E HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 38.
33. Id. para. 38.
34. Id. para. 40-41.
35. Id. para. 42.
36. A. GPum-MADSEN, supra note 15, § 76, at 174 (citation omitted).
37. See U.N. REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 51; A. GPAHL-MADsEN, supra note
15, § 82.
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to life or freedom and may also be found in the presence of other, less
ominous, governmental actions and threats. 8
Finally, to qualify the individual as a refugee, this feared persecution must
be directed at him for one of five enumerated reasons: race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.3 9
"Race" is to be interpreted expansively, encompassing ethnic groups com-
monly referred to as races.4 "Religion" includes the right of public or
private observance4l as well as action or inaction motivated by religion.4 2
"Nationality" in this context includes not only citizenship 43 but may also
embrace ethnic or linguistic groups (and to this extent may be coterminous
with "race")." A "social group" is defined more broadly than race, religion
and nationality;41 it may include, for example, "nobility, capitalists, land-
owners, civil servants, businessmen, professional people, farmers, workers,
members of a linguistic or other minority, even members of certain associ-
ations, clubs or societies." 46 Persecution based on "political opinion" is
perhaps less readily definable than that based on any of the previous
38. U.N. REzruEoa HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 51-53. Goodwin-Gill illustratively notes
that
[t]he core meaning of persecution readily includes the threat of deprivation of life
or physical freedom. In its broader sense, however, it remains very much a
question of degree and proportion; less overt measures may suffice, such as the
imposition of serious economic disadvantage, denial of access to employment, to
the professions, or to education, or other restrictions on the freedoms traditionally
guaranteed in a democratic society, such as speech, assembly, worship, or freedom
of movement.
G. GooDwmr-GmL, supra note 24, at 38-39 (footnotes omitted).
39. Convention, supra note 20, art. I(A)(2); U.N. REFuG HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para.
66; see also A. GRamL-MAnsEN, supra note 15, § 88 (separating these provisions into two
categories: (1) reasons which are beyond the control of the individual-race, nationality,
membership of a particular social group and, perhaps, religion; and, (2) reasons constituting
an individual's character-political opinion and active religion).
40. U.N. REmuoan HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 68. Grabl-Madsen has explained that
"the term 'race' ... is a social more than an ethnographic concept, and is applicable whenever
a person is persecuted because of his ethnic origin." A. GRAHI-MADSEN, supra note 15, § 89,
at 218.
41. U.N. RarFuon HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 71. These rights have as their genesis
article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states: "Everyone has the right
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance."
42. A. GRmam-MADsm, supra note 15, § 89, at 218.
43. A country persecuting its citizens for their citizenship seems a rather absurd proposition.
See G. GooDwI-GHL, supra note 24, at 29.
44. U.N. Rm'uaan HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 74; A. GRA-MADsN, supra note 15,
§ 89, at 218-19; G. GOODWim-GILL, supra note 24, at 29.
45. U.N. Rm'uaza HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 77. A "social group" thus may have
substantial overlap with race, religion and nationality. See Helton, Persecution on Account of
Membership in a Social Group as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 CoLuM. HuM. R's. L. Ray.
39 (1983).
46. A. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 15, § 89, at 219.
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categories. 47 At a minimum, a person must adhere to a political opinion
forbidden by the government;8 publication of this opinion is not required
if the opinion is of such a character that it will probably come to the
attention of the government. 49 An important distinction must be drawn
between political opinions-for which punishment constitutes persecution-
and political acts. Punishment for politically motivated acts may not entitle
a person to refugee status if the punishment conforms to the law. 0
B. The Refugee's Rights Under International Law
Once a person qualifies as a refugee under the Convention, a signatory
(or "Contracting State") to the Convention/Protocol is bound by its pro-
visions. The refugee may then avail herself of certain statutory protections
contained therein.
1. The Principle of Nonrefoulement
Article 33 of the Convention-"Prohibition of Expulsion or Return ('Re-
foulement')"s-1-is the keystone of the refugee's rights.52 The principle of
nonrefoulement dictates that a state may not return a refugee within its
borders, either legally or illegally, to her home country to face political
persecution.5 3 This is an established principle of international law, codified
by the Convention.5
47. See U.N. R1ruoan HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 81.
48. Id. para. 80.
49. Id. para. 82.
50. Id. para. 84.
51. Convention, supra note 20, art. 33(1). "No Contracting State shall expel or return
('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion." Id. Article 42 provides that no Contracting State
may make a reservation to article 33. Id. art. 42.
52. Sexton, supra note 22, at 739.
53. Convention, supra note 20, art. 33(1). This right is qualified by a proviso which states:
The benefit of the provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom
there are reasonable reasons for regarding as a danger to the security of the
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
Id. art. 33(2).
54. Helton, The Proper Role of Discretion in Political Asylum Determinations, 22 SAN
Dm0o L. REv. 999, 1013 (1985); Sexton, supra note 22, at 738. There is some disagreement
over whether nonrefoulement is universally accepted under international law. See A. GRm-
MADsEN, supra note 15, § 41, at 94-98. But cf. The Final Act of the U.N. Conference on the
Status of Stateless Persons, Part IV, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (asserting the universality
of nonrefoulement); G. GooDWiN-GirL, supra note 24, at 99 ("[N]o state today claims any
general right to return refugees or bona-fide asylum seekers to a territory in which they may
face persecution or danger to life or limb."); Helton, supra at 1013 ("[I]ndividuals are generally
considered to have a right to nonrefoulement.").
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Note, however, that while article 33 delineates the right not to be returned,
it does not grant any right to remain in the country of refuge.5 Accordingly,
a Contracting State may, consistent with the Convention, remove the refugee
to another country willing to accept and protect her. 6 In either instance,
the refugee is guaranteed safe haven from the persecution of her home
country, the overriding goal of the article.
2. The Right of Asylum
Asylum, in its contemporary context, is understood as "the protection a
state may afford to an individual by letting him or her enter the territory
of the state and allowing him or her to remain."' 7 Although the concept of
asylum is an ancient one 8 there is no right to asylum in contemporary
international law,5 9 nor is the right embodied in international treaties6° or
the Convention. 6' Rather, the right of asylum must be seen as the right of
the state, as a sovereign entity, to grant asylum at its discretion.62
Even in the absence of an international obligation to grant asylum,
however, many states have statutorily provided for grants of asylum to
refugees. 3 Indeed, "[i]n most countries, persons who are recognized as
Convention refugees will also be entitled to asylum.""4
C. The Change of Circumstances Doctrine
Once declared a Convention refugee, a person may lose that status if he
falls within the ambit of one of the Convention's cessation clauses. 65 These
55. Gross, Note, The Right of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLum. L. REV. 1125,
1126 (1980).
56. Id.
57. Sexton, supra note 22, at 737 n.21.
58. Asylum law has as its antecedents the sanctuary practices of ancient Greece, imperial
Rome, and early Christian civilizations. Goldman & Martin, International Legal Standards
Relating to the Rights of Aliens and Refugees and United States Immigration Law, 5 Hum.
RTs. Q. 302, 309 (1983).
59. G. GOODwN-GIu, supra note 24, at 52.
60. Hyndman, supra note 5, at 152.
61. Sexton, supra note 22, at 737.
62. Id. at 737-38 ("[T]he right to grant asylum remains within the unfettered discretion of
a state as an incident of its sovereignty .... "). A state's territorial integrity-its right to allow
or refuse entrance-is "a pillar of international law." A. GRamu-MADsEN, TERasuoRiAL AsYLuM
23 (1980).
63. Sexton, supra note 22, at 738. Statutory provisions for asylum in the United States are
discussed at notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. U.N. REUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 13. The cessation clauses-article I(C)(l)-
(6)-fall within two general categories: change of circumstances brought about personally by
the refugee and those brought about by fundamental changes in the country from which the
refugee fled. Id. para. 114-15. In the first instance, the refugee may have decided voluntarily
to regain his nationality, resettle in his native country, seek the protection of his native country,
or acquire a new nationality. Id. para. 114.
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clauses provide for the revocation of refugee status upon the occurrence of
certain events eliminating the need for such status, since "international
protection should not be granted where it is no longer necessary or justi-
fied." 66 In particular, article 1(C)(5) states:
This Convention shall cease to apply to any person [who has previously
qualified as a refugee] if: ... [hle can no longer, because the circum-
stances in [connection] with which he has been recognized as a refugee
have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection
of the country of his nationality ....
The word "circumstances" refers to the extant political conditions in the
refugee's home country. 68 If that country has experienced a fundamental
political alteration, such as the replacement of an oppressive or despotic
regime with a democratic one,69 fear of persecution may no longer be well-
founded.7 0 In that case, the need for international protection disappears.
Care should be taken, however, to avoid revoking the status based on
ephemeral or cosmetic changes in the refugee's country. The U.N. Refugee
Handbook notes that "[a] mere-possibly transitory-change in facts sur-
rounding the individual refugee's fear, which does not entail such major
changes of circumstances" should not result in the loss of refugee status.71
In other words, the refugee should not be compelled to justify his status
upon each shift in the prevailing political winds of his country, for this
would undermine the very sense of security for which he initially sought
international aid. 2
Continued protection may occasionally be warranted even in light of a
fundamental change in circumstances: The second paragraph of article
l(C)(5)-although explicitly addressing only statutory refugees73-may also
apply to Convention refugees.7 4 It specifies that the change-of-circumstances
doctrine shall not apply to a refugee "who is able to invoke compelling
reasons arising out of previous persecution for refusing to avail himself of
the protection of the country of nationality." 75 This exception contemplates
particularly atrocious forms of persecution not easily forgotten by the
refugee, 76 and Goodwin-Gill argues that it should be liberally applied since
66. Id. para. 111.
67. Convention, supra note 20, art. I(C)(5).
68. A. GaRun-MADsEN, supra note 15, § 147, at 400.
69. G. GooDwiN-GmLL, supra note 24, at 51.
70. U.N. REumGEE HANDBoOK, supra note 25, para. 135.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 23.
74. U.N. REFuoEE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 136; G. GooDwN-GiLL, supra note 24,
at 52.
75. Convention, supra note 20, art. I(C)(5).
76. U.N. REUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 25, para. 136.
1992]
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refugees frequently suffer ongoing distress as a result of their persecution.,"
At a minimum, the provision seems to preclude a blanket revocation of
status and to insist upon individual reevaluations of that status whenever
fundamental changes have occurred.
Unquestionably, the Convention is a "milestone in the field of refugee
international law": 7 fully 107 countries have acceded to its terms, either
directly or through the Protocol. The United States acceded to the Protocol,
and hence to the substantive terms of the Convention, in 1968. In spite of
its age, the Convention seems as timely today as four decades ago and still
"represents existing international law in force on the subject. ' 79
II. THE REFUGEE UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
The United States has a rather checkered history-both before and after
its accession to the Protocol-of meeting international refugee standards.
This is best demonstrated by analyzing contemporary United States refugee
law0 through two eras: the period from 1952 to 1980, during which refugee
determinations were made under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (INA)"1 and certain amendments thereto; and the period from 1980 to
the present, when these determinations were made pursuant to the Refugee
Act of 1980,12 which significantly amended the INA.
A. United States Refugee and Asylum Law from 1952 to 1980
Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, United States law contained no general
definition of a refugee;s3 instead, that term was defined operationally as a
function of refugee procedures established by the INA. 4 With the growing
awareness that these procedures were being used discriminatorily and to
effectuate ideological goals came pressure for a more comprehensive policy. 5
77. G. GooDWni-GirL, supra note 24, at 52.
78. Sexton, supra note 22, at 735.
79. Starke, supra note 23, at 88.
80. For a more detailed analysis of the history of United States immigration law, see R.
DPiva, AMERiCAN IMMIORATioN Pouc 1924-1952 (1972); M. Mopums, IMIOATioN-TAE
BEL.EAOUERED BUREAUCRACY 11-48 (1985) (chapter entitled "In Search of an Immigration
Policy").
81. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1988)).
The INA represented the convergence of a myriad of previously separate laws governing United
States immigration. E. HARPER, IumoiRATioN LAWS OF THE UNIT= STATES 21 (3d ed. 1975).
82. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
83. Kurzban, supra note 9, at 875. Nor were there any statutory provisions for asylum. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service had promulgated asylum regulations, see 8 C.F.R. §
108 (1972), but these procedures were haphazardly applied. Kurzban, supra note 9, at 875 n.61.
84. See Helton, supra note 7, at 251 n.48.
85. See infra notes 110-17 and accompanying text.
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1. Refugee Procedures Under the INA
The INA established three distinct procedures to grant refugee treatment
to aliens: withholding of deportation, parole, and conditional entry. These
mechanisms were, either explicitly or de facto, used primarily to admit aliens
from countries hostile to the United States.
The INA's withholding provisions 6 delegated to the Attorney General the
discretion to withhold the deportation of an otherwise deportable alien if
she would face physical persecution upon repatriation.8 This provision was
a codification, albeit an inadequate one due to its discretionary nature and
its focus on physical persecution, of the principle of nonrefoulement 8  Under
this discretionary authority, the INS promulgated a stringent standard,
limiting "the favorable exercise of discretion to cases 'of clear probability
of [physical] persecution of the particular individual petitioner."'8 19 After
over a decade of criticism, the physical persecution standard was amended
in 1965 in favor of one allowing withholding if an alien would face perse-
cution "on account of race, religion, or political opinion," 9 but it was not
until well after the United States had acceded to the Protocopl that with-
holding was made mandatory.92 Until that time, "aliens from noncommunist
countries had to satisfy a rigorous burden and standard of proof to suc-
cessfully petition the government to withhold their deportation. "93
The parole power94 permitted the Attorney General to conditionally and
temporarily admit aliens into the country. It was intended
to permit the Attorney General to parole inadmissible aliens into the
United States in emergency cases, such as the case of an alien who
86. The 1952 version read: "The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of
any alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the alien would be
subject to physical persecution and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary for
such reason." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243(h) (current version at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h) (1988)).
87. Id.
88. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text. Note that the United States did not accede to
the Convention (through the Protocol) and its mandatory nonrefoulement strictures until 1968.
See infra text accompanying notes 102-09.
89. In re Joseph, 13 I. & N. -Dec. 70, 72 (BIA 1968) (quoting Lena v. INS, 379 F.2d 536,
538 (7th Cir. 1967)).
90. Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 11(0, 79 Stat. 911, 918.
91. Protocol, supra note 21.
92. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
93. Kurzban, supra note 9, at 874.
94. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 212(d)(5) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5) (1988)):
The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States
temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons
or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for
admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be
regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole
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requires immediate medical attention .. and in cases where it is strictly
in the public interest to have an inadmissible alien present in the United
States, such as, for instance, a witness or for purposes of prosecution. 9'
However, due to the unlimited discretion granted to the Attorney General,
parole came to be used far beyond the scope for which it was originally
intended, and the Attorney General used it to admit hundreds of thousands
of refugees. 96 Once again, those seeking refuge from communist countries
were its prime-and nearly its sole-beneficiaries.7
The final mechanism, conditional entry, was added to the INA in 1965.98
This provision made ideological preferences explicit by addressing itself to
persons who "have fled ... from any communist or communist-dominated
country or area." 99 The number of conditional entrants was restricted to
roughly 10,000,10 and INS regulations limited the countries within which
conditional entry applications could be processed. 10'
2. United States Accession to the Protocol
The United States acceded to the Protocol in 1968. Unfortunately, instead
of bringing the United States into conformance with international law, the
period following accession underscored the fundamental disarray of domestic
refugee policy.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that accession was perceived more
as a symbolic gesture than as a serious commitment to conforming United
States law to international law. President Johnson's Letter of Transmittal
to the Senate stated that accession "would ... constitute a significant and
symbolic element" in United States foreign policy, emphasizing that 1968
was the International Year for Human Rights. 1'02 He assured the Senate that
"[a]ccession to the Protocol would not impinge adversely upon established
shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien
shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was
paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
This section was amended by the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 203(f), 94 Stat.
102, 107-08.
95. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Anisn. NEws 1653, 1706.
96. Kurzban, supra note 9, at 870-71; T. ALaNinors & D. MARnN, supra note 5, at 235.
97. Helton, supra note 7, at 246. Of roughly 233,000 parolees from 1952 to 1968, about
232,000-or well over 99% of them-we'e from communist countries. Id.
98. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 3, 79
Stat. 911, 913 (1965) (repealed 1980).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Those countries were Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Italy,
and Lebanon. 8 C.F.R. § 235.9(a) (1980).
102. 114 CONG. REc. 27,757-58 (1968).
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practices under existing laws in the United States."103 Johnson was echoing
the State Department's analysis of the treaty;104 in particular, Secretary of
State Rusk claimed that the INA withholding of deportation section010 was
already consistent with the nonrefoulement requirements of the Convention.0
This theme was also trumpeted in the Senate. Senator Proxmire assured
his compatriots that there was not "even the slightest possible conflict
between Federal and State law and provisions of the Convention and
protocol."'17 Accession, he concluded, was "the least the Senate can do
during this year dedicated to internationalizing human rights."' 5 Upon those
reassurances, accession was approved. 1 9
As events unfolded, however, Congress became increasingly cognizant of
serious inconsistencies between United States law and its obligations under
international law. For example, as early as 1969, Senator Kennedy complained
that the definition of a refugee remained rooted in a "cold war framework"" 0
and sought to conform this definition to the Convention/Protocol defini-
tion."' Yet immigration authorities remained intransigent, vexing Congress
by "frustrating implementation of the Protocol and acting inconsistently
with its generous underlying humanitarian philosophy. ' 2
That Congressional concern was justified became readily apparent in
November, 1970, in what has since come to be known as the Kudirka affair.
A Lithuanian sailor aboard a Soviet fishing vessel managed to board a
United States Coast Guard cutter and request asylum." 3 Despite substantial
evidence that Kudirka had faced, and would continue to face, persecution" 4
103. Id. at 27,757.
104. Id. at 27,758 (Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State Dean Rusk). Laurence
Dawson, Acting Deputy Director of the State Department's Office of Refugee and Migration
Affairs, similarly assured the Senate that "the United States already meets the standards of
the Protocol" and that accession was good for the United State's image. Id. at 27,844 (Letter
of Laurence Dawson read into record by Sen. Proxmire).
105. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243(h) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
1253(h) (1988)).
106. 114 CONG REc. 27,758 (1968).
107. Id. at 27,757. Two reservations to the Protocol dealt with unrelated matters. Id. at
27,758.
108. Id. at 27,757.
109. Id. at 29,607.
110. 115 CoNG. REc. 36,966 (1969).
111. See S. 3202, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. § 6(a)(7)(B), 115 CONG. REc. 36,968 (1969) ("The
term alien refugee means ... any alien ... who has fled or shall flee from and is unwilling
to return to any country owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion ... .
112. Helton, supra note 7, at 249.
113. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
114. Attempted Defection by Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the House Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1970) [hereinafter Kudirka Hearings]. Kudirka
claimed that he had been "ill-treated, denied his civic rights, discriminated against, relegated
to menial jobs in the past, and denied the issuance of regular Soviet papers such as a passport
or a mariner's certificate" for refusing a Soviet demand that he be an informer in Lithuania.
Id.
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he was returned to the Soviet ship where he was allegedly beaten uncon-
scious."' This action seemed clearly to contravene the implicit assumption
of the Convention "that a reasonable inquiry be made to determine whether
the defector is entitled to refugee status under the Convention and Proto-
col.""16 The full-scale Congressional hearings which followed testify to Con-
gressional outrage over the incident. For the remainder of the decade,
Congress became increasingly impatient with Executive Branch recalcitrance
to fulfill the spirit of the Protocol and sought to revise such practices." 7
B. The Refugee Act of 1980
With the Refugee Act of 1980,118 Congress sought to bring United States
law into compliance with the Convention/Protocol and to eliminate the
previously piecemeal approach to refugee law. 19 A comprehensive defimition
of a refugee was, for the first time, enacted into law.' 2° Existing laws were
amended to meet the dictates of the Convention/Protocol, 2' and sections
pertaining to refugee admission, asylum, and adjustment of status to per-
manent resident alien were added.'2 However, an analysis of a decade of
decision making under the Act compels the conclusion that ideological
concerns continued to dominate refugee policy.
1. The Definition of a Refugee
Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Refugee Act of 1980 defines as a refugee
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ...
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.'2
Legislative intent was twofold: to bring United States law into accord with
the Convention/Protocol definition'7A and to remove ideological biases.
115. J. GOWA, OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING THE STATUS OF REFU-
GEES AND THE GRANTING OF Asytud: THE CASE OF SR.AS KuDICA 5 (1975).
116. Kudirka Hearings, supra note 114, at 246.
117. See, e.g., H.R. 981, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 5, 119 CONG. REc. 31,454-55 (1973);
S. 2643, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 5, 119 CONG. REc. 35,734-35 (1973); S. 2405, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 5, 119 CONG. REC. 29,946, 29,948 (1975) (all explicitly embracing the definition of
refugee contained in the Convention/Protocol).
118. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
119. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984).
120. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 130-36 and accompanying text.
122. See infra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
123. Refugee Act of 1980 § 101(a)(42)(A) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
124. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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That the 'definition substantially resembled the Convention/Protocol def-
inition was no accident. Both houses of Congress explicitly alluded to the
Protocol during hearings on the bill: The Senate noted that "the new
definition will bring United States law into conformity with our international
treaty obligations under the [Protocol],"-2 and the "House amendment
incorporated the U.N. definition."- 6
Similarly, Congress intended, by adopting the Convention/Protocol defi-
nition, to eliminate the ideologically biased approach that had previously
characterized refugee determinations. I27 In doing so, it gave notice to im-
migration authorities that their compliance would be closely monitored;1 28
however, this threat was ineffective at significantly reducing ideological
decisions. 129
2. Withholding, Parole, and Conditional Entry
The Refugee Act of 1980 significantly altered the tripartite treatment
(withholding, parole, and conditional entry) accorded refugees under the
earlier version of the INA. Conditional entry, with its explicit ideological
quotas, was repealed,'30 and withholding and parole were amended.
The withholding provisions of INA, which had been discretionary, were
made mandatory. As amended, that section now reads:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."'
This revision seemingly brought United States law into accord with the
mandatory nonrefoulement provisions of the Convention/Protocol. 3 2
125. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 1, at 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 144.
126. H.R. CoNt. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 160; see also Smacr COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., SECOND SEmiANUAI REPORT TO CONGRESS 18 (Joint Comm. Print
1980) ("[T]he definition of refugee under the Refugee Act of 1980 increased U.S. compliance
with the U.N. Protocol on Refugees.").
127. Helton, supra note 7, at 251-52; Stepick, Haitian Boat People: A Study in the
Conflicting Forces Shaping U.S. Immigration Policy, 45 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 163, 173
(1982).
128. Helton, supra note 7, at 252.
129. See infra notes 156-83 and accompanying text.
130. Refugee Act of 1980 § 203, 94 Stat. at 107.
131. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
132. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 421. Mandatory withholding under § 243(h) is not without its
qualifications. Section 243(h)(2) exempts from its provisions aliens who themselves participated
in proscribed persecution, have been convicted of certain crimes, are threats to the security of
the United States, or may have committed a serious nonpolitical crime. These qualifications
arguably are broader than those allowed under article 33 of the Convention. See supra note
53.
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Parole was amended to harness the nearly absolute discretion previously
enjoyed by the Attorney General. 33 As amended, the Act circumscribes the
exercise of parole by declaring:
The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien
who is a refugee unless the Attorney General determines that compelling
reasons in the public interest with respect to that particular alien require
that the alien be paroled into the United States rather than be admitted
as a refugee .... 11
By limiting parole to this case-by-case determination, Congress sought to
reduce its incidence'3 5 and to close "the loophole under which large numbers
of people had been admitted to the United States."'
36
3. Refugees, Asylees, and Permanent Resident Aliens
These previously ad hoc determinations were superseded by two compre-
hensive programs: the overseas refugee program 37 and the asylum program.'
Both of these provide a mechanism for the eventual adjustment of the alien's
status from refugee to permanent resident alien. 39
The overseas refugee program' 40 addresses aliens applying for admission
from outside United States territory. It grants to the Attorney General the
authority to admit, within numerical limits set by the President in consultation
with Congress,' 4' "any refugee who is not firmly resettled in any foreign
country, is determined to be of special humanitarian concern to the United
States, and is admissible ... as an immigrant under this Act."' 42 To qualify
for admission, the alien must adduce that she is a refugee as defined by
section 101(a)(42)(A); 43 having done so, she is then admitted to the United
States as a "refugee."' 44
133. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
134. Refugee Act of 1980 § 212(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(B) (emphasis added).
135. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 781, supra note 126, at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmmN. NEws at 161; Kurzban, supra note 9, at 878-79.
136. Scanlan, supra note 3, at 633.
137. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
138. Id. § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
139. Id. § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159. These provisions are thus unlike withholding under
§ 243(h), which is a temporary measure and from which an alien may not be granted permanent
residence.
140. Id. § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157.
141. Section 207(e) of the INA dictates the form of those consultations and requires
"Cabinet-level representatives" to meet with the Committees on the Judiciary of both houses.
Id. § 207(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(e). These limitations are then issued in Presidential Determinations
and printed in the Federal Register.
142. Id. § 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1). Refugees are also exempted from certain exclusion
provisions of § 212 pertaining to normal immigrants. Id.
143. See supra text accompanying note 123.
144. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARnN, supra note 5, at 625.
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In spite of the perhaps archetypal American belief in the right of political
asylum,' 4" the Refugee Act of 1980 for the first time enacted asylum
procedures into law.'" Section 208(a) provides as follows:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry... to
apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the discretion
of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
alien is a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A)." 7
A person admitted under this section is referred to as an "asylee." Asylum
may be terminated if an alien loses her refugee status due to a change of
circumstances in her home country.'"
Section 209149 outlines the steps whereby refugees and asylees may adjust
to permanent resident alien status. °50 Refugees may adjust under section
209(a) provided that certain minimal criteria are met. 5' There are no numerical
145. See, e.g., Immigration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.
621 (1981) ("[T]he right of asylum is in many ways the most basic of all human rights. This
country was founded and was build (sic) on a promise to open doors to those who seek to
escape persecution .... ).
146. S. REP. No. 256, supra note 1, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD.iN.
NEws 149-50.
147. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). While the
overseas refugee program addresses aliens outside of the United States, asylum concerns those
already "physically present" and thus to some extent overlaps with withholding of deportation.
In fact, INS regulations provide that a request for withholding is also to be treated as a
request for asylum. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1990). But see infra notes 156-83 and accompanying
text (discussing the divergent development of the two).
148. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b), stipulates that
"[a]sylum granted under subsection (a) may be terminated if the Attorney General, pursuant
to such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe, determines that the alien is no
longer a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) owing to a change in circumstances
in the alien's country of nationality." See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (discussing
the change of circumstances doctrine under international law).
149. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159.
150. Permanent resident alien status is for the most part self-explanatory. The permanent
resident alien remains an alien (that is, not a citizen) but is allowed to remain permanently in
the United States. He enjoys most of the advantages of citizenship, such as constitutional
protections and the unrestricted ability to work, and shoulders most of its burdens, such as
taxes and military conscription; he is not, however, allowed to vote or to hold elective office,
privileges enjoyed solely by citizens. D. WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE IN A
Nurrssuu § 10-1, at 274, § 10-3, at 276 (1989).
151. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159:
(a)(1) Any alien who has been admitted to the United States under section 207-
(A) whose admission has not been terminated by the Attorney General
pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may prescribe,
(B) who has been physically present in the United States for at least one
year, and
(C) who has not acquired permanent resident status, shall, at the end of
such year period, return or be returned to the custody of the Service for
inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an
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limitations and adjustment is, for the most part, routine. s2 Asylee adjust-
ments are governed by section 209(b), and that privilege is far more atten-
uated for asylees than for refugees.'53 For example, there is a numerical limit
on the number of adjustments, 5 4 and the asylee must be able to demonstrate
that he remains a "refugee," which exposes him to loss of that status
through a change of circumstances. No such provision attaches to refugees.'55
4. Determinations Under the Refugee Act of 1980
The decade since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 demonstrates
that it is not the apotheosis envisioned by its drafters.15 6 Two main devel-
opments substantiate this contention. The first is the administrative and
judicial divergence of withholding and asylum, and the second is the contin-
uing role of ideology.
Congress "clearly intended that no substantive distinction be made under
the 1980 Act in determining eligibility for [withholding of deportation and
immigrant ....
(2) Any alien who is found upon inspection and examination by an
immigration officer pursuant to paragraph (1) or after a hearing before a
special inquiry officer to be admissible ... as an immigrant under this
Act ... shall, notwithstanding any numerical limitation specified in this
Act, be regarded as lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent
residence as of the date of such alien's arrival into the United States.
152. T. Awm'om' & D. MARIN, supra note 5, at 625-26.
153. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 209(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (amended 1990):
Not more than five thousand of the refugee admissions authorized under section
207(a) in any fiscal year may be made available by the Attorney General, in the
Attorney General's discretion and under such regulations as the Attorney General
may prescribe, to adjust to the status of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence the status of any alien granted asylum who-
(1) applies for such adjustment,
(2) has been physically present in the United States for at least one year
after being granted asylum,
(3) continues to be a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A)
or a spouse or child of such a refugee,
(4) is not firmly resettled in any foreign country, and
(5) is admissible ... as an immigrant under this Act for ... adjustment
of such alien.
Upon approval of an application under this subsection, the Attorney General
shall establish a record of the alien's admission for lawful permanent residence
as of the date one year before the date of the approval of the application.
154. The number was increased from 5,000 to 10,000 by the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-649, § 104(a)(1), 104 Stat. at 4986.
155. Refugee status is revocable if "the Attorney General determines that the alien was not
in fact a refugee within the meaning of section 101(a)(42)(A) at the time of the alien's
admission." Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 207(c)(4) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
1157(c)(4)) (emphasis added). Thus, a refugee appears virtually immune to revocation due to
a change of circumstances in his home country. T. AimNmorr & D. MARTIN, supra note 5,
at 641.
156. See S. REP. No. 256, supra note 1, at 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmaN.
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asylum]." 1' Nevertheless, two important distinctions have emerged. The first
distinction is the development of separate evidentiary standards for the two.
Section 243(h) defines as eligible for withholding an alien whose "life or
freedom would be threatened ... on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."'5 s In applying
this standard, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had since the 1950s
required applicants for withholding under section 243(h) to adduce a "clear
probability of persecution."'519 Alternatively, the more recent asylum section
internalized the Convention/Protocol refugee definition in section
101(a)(42)(A), with its "well-founded fear" standard16 Some circuit courts
of appeals maintained that this also effectuated a loosening of the clear
probability standard under section 243(h),' 6' while others insisted that the
previous standard was unaffected.162 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
to consider the issue in INS v. Stevic. 6 It held that "the 'clear probability
of persecution' standard remains applicable to § 243(h) withholding of
deportation claims," but it declined to explicate the "well-founded fear"
asylum standard,' 64 thus leaving unresolved the distinction, if any, between
the two.
That issue was finally resolved by the Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca.1
In that case, the INS argued that the standards were identical and both
subject to a "more likely than not" test,'" but the Court disagreed. It
"concluded that Congress did not intend the two standards to be identical."' 7
The Court indicated that the asylum standard'" was less onerous since its
NEws 141, 141:
The Refugee Act of 1979 establishes for the first time a comprehensive United
States refugee resettlement and assistance policy. It reflects one of the oldest
themes in American history-welcoming homeless refugees to our shores. It gives
statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian
concerns, not reflected in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as
amended. And it places into law what we do for refugees now by custom, and
on an ad hoc basis ....
157. Scanlan, supra note 3, at 625.
158. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
159. T. Atmmxo & D. MARrm, supra note 5. This interpretation persisted notwithstanding
accession to the Protocol. See In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310, 320-21 (BIA 1973).
160. See supra notes 22-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Convention/Protocol
definition); see also supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing this definition in
United States law).
161. See Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd and remanded, 467 U.S.
407 (1984).
162. See Rejaie v. INS, 691 F.2d 139, 146 (3d Cir. 1982).
163. 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
164. Id. at 430.
165. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
166. Id. at 431.
167. Id. at 446.
168. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
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focus is the applicant's subjective mental state; 169 that the fear must addi-
tionally be "well-founded" does not "transform the standard into a 'more
likely than not' one.' ' 170 Once again, however, the Court declined to Mu-
minate further the "well-founded fear" standard.17'
In a case decided after Cardoza-Fonseca, however, the BIA interpreted
that standard as implying a reasonable person test; that is, "an applicant
for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable
person in his circumstances would fear persecution."' 72 The court held that
a reasonable person may be said to fear persecution if
(1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort; (2) the
persecutor is already aware, or could ... become aware, that the alien
possesses this belief or characteristic; (3) the persecutor has the capability
of punishing the alien; and (4) the persecutor has the inclination to
punish the alien.173
The second main distinction between withholding and asylum is the
increasing emphasis placed on the discretionary aspect of asylum. 74 Although
the text of section 208 allows for discretion,175 it was not until the 1982
decision in In re Salim'76 that the BIA considered a discretionary denial of
asylum to an alien who had established a likelihood of persecution. Salim
had fraudulently purchased another person's passport to gain entrance to
the United States and was ordered deported by an immigration judge.' 7" The
Board found that he had established a probability of persecution and ordered
a temporary withholding 78 but upheld the discretionary denial of asylum,
concluding that it was justified by Salim's fraud. 179 Since Salim, asylum
169. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text (discussing the subjective element of the
refugee definition).
170. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 431.
171. Id. at 448.
172. In re Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987). This interpretation appears
consistent with that advocated by Grahl-Madsen. See supra text accompanying note 36.
173. Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 446 (quoting and modifying In re Acosta, 19 I. & N.
Dec. 211 (BIA 1985)).
174. In contrast, withholding is mandatory if the criteria are met. See supra notes 131-32
and accompanying text.
175. "[IThe alien may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General ......
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
176. 18 I. & N. Dec. 311 (BIA 1982).
177. Id. at 312.
178. Id. at 313.
179. In reaching its decision, the Board placed a great deal of emphasis on the fraud:
This Board finds that the fraudulent avoidance of the orderly refugee procedures
that this country has established is an extremely adverse factor which can only
be overcome with the most unusual showing of countervailing equities. This case
before us does not present such equities. Consequently, the application for asylum
relief will be denied as a matter of discretion.
Id. at 316.
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applicants have "with increasing frequency [been] denied asylum as a matter
of discretion."' 1
The net effect of these developments has been the continuing dominance
of ideology-a legacy of cold-war mentality."' An alien fleeing communist-
dominated regimes or other regimes the United States opposes is still far
more likely to be granted refugee status or asylum than aliens fleeing friendly
countries. In fact, "[s]ince passage of the Act, persons from 'hostile'
countries are favored in refugee/asylee admissions to the same extent as
prior to passage of the Act."' As one commentator caustically wrote:
"Eight years after the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, its mandate that
uniform and neutral standards be utilized in conferring refugee protection
remains unfulfilled. Rather, the Act's mandate is subservient to foreign and
domestic policy considerations which continue to dominate protection deter-
minations.""8 3
III. REcENT DEVELOPMENTS IN UNITED STATES RIEFUGEE LAW
Two recent legislative initiatives similarly reveal the persistence of this ad
hoc and ideological decision making. The first is a provision in the Foreign
Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1990 (Foreign Operations Act)'1 relaxing the refugee standard for a select
group of aliens. The second initiative concerns a provision in the recently
enacted Immigration Act of 199085 providing favored treatment to certain
asylees.
A. Preferential Refugee Treatment
Congress seemingly abandoned its commitment to a nondiscriminatory
refugee standard with the passage of the Foreign Operations Act. A provision
in that bill resurrected a double standard in refugee determinations.
After the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, aliens seeking refugee
status had to prove an individualized well-founded fear of persecution. s6
Section 599(D) of the Foreign Operations Act, however, establishes a different
standard for some aliens:
180. Helton, supra note 54, at 1000.
181. Stepick, supra note 127, at 172.
182. B. YARuoLD, UNITrD STATES R FuGEE AND AsYLUm POLIcy: FACTORS THAT IMPACT
LEGISIATrVE, ADmnsTRATrvE AND JuDicIAL DEcoNs 118 (1988) (citations omitted). For her
doctoral dissertation, Yarnold conducted an exhaustive statistical study of post-1980 refugee
and asylum policy. She concluded that, at least through 1985, decision makers "were over-
whelmingly influenced by one variable: whether an alien is from a 'hostile' country of origin,
defined as a country with a communist, socialist, or leftist form of government." Id. at xix.
183. Helton, New Asylum Rules: The Need for Reform in Asylum and Refugee Protection
in the United States, in XI IN DmF-NsE or TH AnmN 115, 115 (1989).
184. Pub. L. No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 1195 (1989) [hereinafter Foreign Operations Act].
185. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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In the case of an alien who is within a category of aliens established
under subsection (b), the alien may establish, for purposes of admission
as a refugee under section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
that the alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion by asserting such a fear and asserting a credible basis for concern
about the possibility of such persecution.-
This section applies to Soviet Jews or Evangelical Christians, those active
in the Ukrainian Catholic Church or Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and
selected Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians. 's As the italicized clause
indicates, a credible fear of persecution-instead of a well-founded fear-
suffices to qualify these persons as refugees.
This legislation was clearly intended to bestow preferential treatment. The
distinction between the "well-founded fear" standard and the "credible basis
for concern" standard is apparent in the conference report on the bill: A
"credible basis of concern" is established if the alien asserts that a "similarly
situated individual[ in his or her geographic locale" has been persecuted or
the alien has "knowledge, either from having read of or heard of ...
[persecution] as affecting persons in the same category residing elsewhere in
the home country."1 9 The results speak for themselves: denial rates dropped
from a high of more than 30% to less than 10%.'9
B. Preferential Asylee Treatment
An eleventh hour addition to the Immigration Act of 1990 also illustrates
the continuing interrelationship between ideology and refugee law. The
amendment was the product of political exigencies resulting from the dem-
ocratic revolutions experienced by a number of countries in 1990 and grants
favorable treatment to certain groups of asylees.
187. Foreign Operations Act, supra note 184, § 599(D) (emphasis added). Perversely, the
new standard was precipitated by the Attorney General's attempt to conform the Soviet
Refugee Program to the nonideological dictates of the Refugee Act of 1980. Prior to 1988,
Soviet citizens were allowed a nearly presumptive refugee status. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTmNo
OmCE, REPORT TO CONORESSIONAL REQuEsToEs, SOViET REFUGEES: PRocEsSING AND ADmT-
TANCE TO TiH UNITED STATES, 136 CONG. REc. S6841-42 (daily ed. May 23, 1990) [hereinafter
GAO REPORT]. In August of 1988 the Attorney General altered this approach by requiring a
case-by-case adjudication-"like all other refugee applcants"-of Soviet citizens. Id. at S6841.
As a result, refugee status was increasingly denied to Soviets who could not meet the standard
required of everybody else: denial rates increased from 6.7% in December, 1988 to 36.5% by
March, 1989. House Votes Refugee Status for Soviet Jews, Others, 1989 CoNG. Q. WEEKLY
REP. 1788.
188. Foreign Operations Act, supra note 184, § 599(D)(b)(2)(A)-(C). The Attorney General
may also establish other "categories of aliens who are or were nationals and residents of [the
Soviet Union, Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia]" and "who share common characteristics that
identify them as targets of persecution." Id. § 599(D)(b)(1)(A)-(B).
189. H.R. CoFU. REP. No. 344, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H8495, H8515
(daily ed. Nov. 13, 1989). Compare this to the well-founded fear standard, described in the
text at note 123.
190. GAO REPORT, supra note 187, at S6842.
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In 1989, the Senate approved major revisions to United States immigration
levels and criteria; 91 the House began consideration of a similar bill later
that year. In the course of this process, several countries experienced signif-
icant changes of government, evolving from totalitarian to democratic systems
seemingly overnight. 192 As a consequence, asylees from those countries were
threatened with revocation of their refugee status and a concomitant loss of
the opportunity to adjust to permanent resident alien status due to a change
in circumstances.1 93 The INS particularly identified Poland, Hungary, Pan-
ama, and Nicaragua as having experienced fundamental changes and ad-
vanced a policy of denying adjustment to asylees from those countries. 94
Approximately 11,000 asylees were at risk of losing their status. 95
In response, Representatives Lipinski and Rostenkowski proffered an
amendment entitled "Opportunity for Adjustment of Status Before Termi-
nation of Asylum Status" to the House bill.' 96 Although certainly motivated
by concern for Lipinski's and Rostenkowski's Polish constituents, the Lip-
inski amendment sought to accomplish more than just to remedy the then
current circumstances and addressed itself to the possibility of similar prob-
lems in the future. The amendment appended to the asylum termination
section of the INA' 97 the following:
The Attorney General may not terminate such [asylum] status on the
basis that the alien is no longer a refugee unless the alien has been
provided notice of such termination and the right to apply for adjustment
of status under section 209(b) and an opportunity (of not less than 90
days beginning one-year after the date the alien is granted asylum) to
file an application for adjustment of status under such section to that
of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.'"
Additionally, the adjustment of status provisions were brought into con-
formity by removing the requirement that an asylee continue to be a refugee
to adjust to permanent resident alien status.199
191. S. 358, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 135 CoNo. REc. S8639 (daily ed. July 24, 1989).
192. See generally Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1990, at A33, col. 5 (discussing Polish democra-
tization); Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1990, at C7, col. 3 (discussing Nicaraguan democratization);
Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1990, at Al, col. 4 (discussing Panamanian democratization); Christian
Sci. Monitor, Oct. 25, 1989, at 3, col. 2 (discussing Hungarian democratization).
193. See supra notes 65-77, 148 and accompanying text (discussing the change of circum-
stances doctrine).
194. 136 CoNG. REc. H8689 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski).
195. These asylees comprised approximately 9000 Nicaraguans, 1000 Poles, 450 Hungarians,
and 350 Panamanians. Id. (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
196. Id. "Adjustment of Status" in this context means that the refugee may adjust to
permanent resident status and thus may remain permanently in the United States regardless of
conditions in his country of origin. See supra note 150.
197. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 208(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b). See supra note
148.
198. 136 CoNo. Rac. H8688-89 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (amendment offered by Rep.
Lipinski).
199. Id. at H8689.
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The amendment effectively granted to all asylees whose home countries
had experienced significant improvements in government the opportunity to
adjust their status regardless of those changes. Underlying the amendment
was a normative judgment that those who uprooted themselves to flee
persecution and seek asylum in the United States should not be forcibly
uprooted yet another time.2 This provision was thus designed to affect not
only current Polish and other similarly situated asylees, but also to prevent
the recurrence of such a dilemma in the future.
The House of Representatives passed the Lipinski amendment and incor-
porated it into the bill.'20 Subsequently, the Senate and House sent their
differing versions of the bill to conference to resolve the disagreements.
What emerged from the conference and ultimately became law in the
Immigration Act of 1990,201 however, was an asylee adjustment provision
quite different from the Lipinski amendment.
The Act contained two future-oriented provisions,2 but additional pro-
visions reveal yet another instance of patchwork lawmaking. Section 104(d)
of the Act establishes the mechanics for "Adjustment of Certain Former
Asylees":
[Tihe provisions of section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act shall also apply to an alien-(A) who was granted asylum before the date of the enactment of this
Act (regardless of whether or not such asylum has been terminated under
section 208(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act),(B) who is no longer a refugee because of a change in circumstances in
a foreign state, and
(C) who was (or would be) qualified for adjustment of status under
section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of
the enactment of this Act but for paragraphs (2) and (3) thereof and but
for any numerical limitation under such section.-
The myopic quality of this provision is apparent: it has no prospective
utility. For those aliens who become asylees after the Act's enactment,
200. Representative Rostenkowski explained:
[T]he asylees have begun to set down roots here in the United States. They have
homes, and jobs. Their children are in our schools. They have joined American
organizations, learned our language, and even taken an intense interest in our
domestic and international affairs. Notably, they have also given us the benefit
of their energy and their fresh outlook on our own dedication to democracy and
freedom.
Id.
201. H.R. 4300, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 328, 136 CONG. REc. H8737 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
1990).
202. 136 CONG. REc. H9995 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990) (House); 136 CONo. REc. S16,536
(daily ed. Oct. 23, 1990) (Senate).
203. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
204. The ceiling on asylee adjustments was raised from 5,000 to 10,000, and the President
was asked to enumerate annually to Congress the number of aliens granted refugee status who
were also granted asylum. Id. § 104(a)-(b).
205. Id. § 104(d), 104 Stat. at 4985.
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nothing has changed; they must continue to meet the criteria of section
209(b) to adjust and are subject to its change of circumstances measures.
By contrast, those aliens who are no longer asylees due to a change of
circumstances (namely certain Poles, Panamanians, Nicaraguans, and Hun-
garians) are accorded both the right to adjust and the additional benefit of
being immune to any numerical limitation on adjustment.206 A hypothetical
example serves to illustrate the point. Under section 104(d) of the Immigration
Act of 1990, a Panamanian granted asylum shortly before Panama's over-
night democratization, who most certainly would be susceptible to revocation
of asylee status due to a change of circumstances-and who may actually
have had that status revoked-is nevertheless permitted the opportunity to
remain permanently in the United States. Yet an alien granted asylum on
November 30, 1990-one day after the enactment of the Act-whose country
later experiences fundamental changes and who is thus situated precisely as
the Panamanian was, may well lose his asylee status and face repatriation.
Such disparate treatment appears unjustifiable. So without mentioning ide-
ology or country names, Congress nevertheless has once again demonstrated
a preference for those who have fled' states hostile to the United States.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The philosophic underpinning of the Refugee Act of 198027-that all
refugees should be treated equally-is ill-served by these recent laws. An
egalitarian refugee policy need not, however, be a chimerical pursuit. The
following two recommendations should suffice to bring United States policy
at least somewhat closer to this goal.
My first recommendation is that the United States should refrain from
manipulating its refugee law-as in, for example, selectively relaxing refugee
standards-to accommodate certain groups for ideological reasons. Such a
practice violates article 3 of the Convention, which dictates that "[tihe
Contracting States shall apply the provisions of this Convention to refugees
without discrimination as to ... country of origin."2m Granting special
consideration to aliens from hostile countries, especially when it appears that
206. Section 104(c) contains a "Waiver of Numerical Limitation for Certain Current Asy-
lees":
The numerical limitation on the number of aliens whose status may be adjusted
under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act shall not apply to
an alien described in subsection (d) or to an alien who has applied for adjustment
of status under such section on or before June 1, 1990.
Id. § 104(c).
207. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
208. Convention, supra note 20, art. 3; see also UNITED NATIONS, TiE UNITED NATIONS
AND HuMAN Rioarrs 57 (1978), reprinted in Goldman & Martin, supra note 58, at 310 (The
Convention is based on the principle "that there should be no discrimination based on ...
country of origin among refugees.").
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they may not even qualify as refugees, certainly constitutes discrimination
based on nationality. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that refugee
levels are subject to numerical ceilings. Granting special status to less
deserving aliens may ultimately have the indefensible effect of excluding
deserving aliens.
On a more fundamental level, and perhaps more importantly, such a
practice cheapens the United States' commitment to human rights. President
Bush recently wrote:
Ever since the first Europeans came to this country in search of freedom
and opportunity, America has been viewed as a safe haven and a source
of hope for millions of people around the globe. We take tremendous
pride in our leading efforts to assist refugees, and we continue to cherish
the great and generous spirit embodied by our magnificent Statue of
Liberty. As Emma Lazarus wrote in her timeless sonnet to the famed
Mother of Exiles, "from her beacon-hand glows worldwide welcome."-"
These are grand and, to a large extent, true words. Yet, in allowing ideology
to creep into refugee considerations, the United States undermines them. For
at its most elementary level, refugee law reflects the noblest of humanitarian
instincts: to help those who need it. Ideology simply has no part in these
determinations; it is as irrelevant as the color of a refugee's eyes.
The use of ideology is frequently rationalized by arguing that since far
more aliens apply for refugee status than can possibly be admitted such an
additional selection criterion is necessary to narrow their numbers. For
example, consider this statement by Representative Morrison:
The people who can come here are a trickle [compared to those who
want to come]. Therefore, there is an impossible picking and choosing.
By the very nature of things, there has to be a reason for why we take
a particular person. And that gives rise to politics, not in a corrupt
sense, but in a sense of identifying American interests.2' 0
However, an ideological criterion is purely arbitrary and has nothing to
do with discerning who is worthy of protection. "American interests" are
not the issue; humanitarian interests are. If a limiting criterion is necessary,
then at the very least it should be tied to humanitarian, not political,
considerations.
Furthermore, at least when applied to justify the double-standard refugee
definition of the Foreign Operations Act,2 1 such an argument assumes what
209. Proclamation No. 6219, supra note 4.
210. Biskupic, supra note 1, at 594. Rep. Morrison's underlying claim, that applications
outstrip openings, is true. For example, President Reagan authorized the admission of 72,500
refugees for 1988. Pres. Determination No. 88-01, 52 Fed. Reg. 42,073 (1987). There were
125,176 refugee applications that year; 80,282 were ultimately approved. IMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 1988 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMP-
ORATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 49 (Table 24). Few would advocate allowing all of the
estimated 15 million current worldwide refugees to enter the United States. See supra note 4.
211. See supra Part III.A.
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it seeks to prove. Select Soviet groups receive the benefit of a relaxed
standard, so that argument goes, because there has to be some way to choose
from among the overwhelming number of refugees needing protection. But
this begs the question, for it presupposes that those groups were entitled to
protection in the first place. The fact that denial rates were high when the
normal refugee standard was applied indicates that such an assumption is
questionable at best.
Accordingly, the refugee standard should be consistently and even-handedly
applied to all applicants irrespective of their country of nationality. Only by
doing so can the United States meet its humanitarian and international law
obligations.
My second recommendation is that asylees should be given the opportunity
to adjust to permanent resident alien status. To this extent, the asylee
adjustment provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990212 should be repealed
and replaced by provisions more closely resembling the Lipinski amend-
ment.213 A number of observations justify this conclusion.
First, there is no compelling reason for distinguishing between refugees
and asylees for purposes of adjustment to permanent resident alien status.
Currently, the former are seemingly immune to the change-of-circumstances
doctrine and are allowed adjustment virtually as a matter of course while
the latter are required to prove continuing refugee status. 2 4 Both have met
the burden of adducing their recognition as refugees. The only distinction
between them is that asylees applied for protection from within the United
States while refugees applied from outside the United States.215 Asylum
seekers who abuse this process (by fraudulently entering the country, for
example) may justly be denied asylum as a matter of discretion. 26 Thus
aliens granted asylum are, practically by definition, refugees whose presence
in the United States is not problematic. Why treat them differently?
Second, this approach would provide a measure of protection against hasty
conclusions that a person's home country has undergone fundamental polit-
ical changes. The road leading from a repressive government may not be
straight; there may be occasional setbacks. Allowing the asylee the oppor-
tunity to adjust to permanent resident alien status would protect her from
repatriation to a country experiencing perhaps only short-term changes. 21 7
212. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 104, 104 Stat. 4978, 4985.
213. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
215. See I naoRAmoz AND NATURALIZATioN SERVICE, supra note 210, at xxvii ("The defi-
nition of an asylee conforms to that of a refugee. The only difference is the location of the
alien upon application; the asylee is in the United States or at a port of entry and the refugee
is outside the country.").
216. See supra notes 174-180 and accompanying text. These aliens may still qualify for
withholding of deportation, from which there are no adjustment provisions.
217. For a discussion of how ephemeral changes in a refugee's home country do not
constitute a change of circumstances, see notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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Finally, even if the asylee's country has experienced a lasting change of
circumstances and the asylee no longer faces persecution, the effects of that
persecution may linger. Refugees may flee their home country with little
more than the clothes on their backs218 and may have no real family, job,
or home to which to return. Compelling repatriation in such circumstances,
especially when the asylee may already have established significant ties to
the United States, may be nearly as traumatic as fleeing persecution in the
first place. 219
Such a provision ultimately may have the effect of chilling the favorable
exercise of the discretion to grant asylum. But such an argument seems
tenuous, because it assumes that these decision makers can portend funda-
mental changes in an applicant's home country. Otherwise, arbitrary denials
will be subject to reversal. Furthermore, even assuming a chilling effect, the
refugee who is denied asylum is no worse off than an asylee whose status
is later revoked. Since the refugee in the first instance will still qualify for
withholding of deportation, both will be repatriated when the circumstances
change in their home country. At least the withholdee will know all along
that her status is strictly temporary.
CONCLUSION
The Refugee Act of 1980 was, on its face, a significant step toward
abandoning the ideological preferences which had marked United States
refugee law for over fifty years. Unfortunately, the practice has not lived
up to the theory. Discrimination has been reinserted into refugee decisions,
and no practical distinctions between pre-1980 and post-1980 determinations
are apparent.
In addition, more recent developments in United States refugee law indicate
that the nonideological mandates of the Refugee Act of 1980 and the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees have been further subverted.
By establishing ad hoc standards that favor certain groups over others,
Congress has reverted to a practice that it had professedly sought to eliminate.
As a consequence, the ideologically favored refugees of the past four decades
remain the ideologically favored refugees of the 1990s.
With the demise of communist hegemony in Eastern Europe and the
disintegration of the Soviet Union itself may come a tendency to dismiss
such practices as relics of the past. Such a response is undoubtedly premature.
In the first place, it ignores the very real possibility that past ideologically
influenced decisions may have skewed the plurality politics of refugee law
218. LaPointe, Note, Discrimination in Asylum Law: The Implications of Jean v. Nelson,
62 IND. L.J. 127, 141 (1986).
219. This argument is analogous to § 1(C)(5) of the Convention. See supra notes 73-78 and
accompanying text.
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by creating and empowering cohesive and vociferous refugee lobbying groups.?
If so, it is the legacy of ideological preferences, rather than continuing
ideological preferences, that must be redressed. Furthermore, there remains
the likelihood that the United States, having lost the Soviet Union as an
adversary, may turn its attention to, and consequently favor, refugees from
other hostile countries. Only by adopting and adhering to nondiscriminatory
refugee legislation will the United States fulfill its international and human-
itarian obligations.
220. See Biskupic, supra note 1, at 594 (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith: "I sometimes get
the feeling that our refugee policy is determined by how long the line is outside some
congressman's office .... ").

